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Non-technical summary  
 
 
 
 
The main problems on the German labor market are long-term 
unemployment and joblessness among the low skilled, although both 
problems do of course overlap. Despite the Hartz reforms, the long-term 
unemployment rate has leapt up in recent years and – as defined by the 
OECD – reached 51.8% in 2004. According to figures published by the 
Federal Labor Institute, there has been a continuous increase in the 
number of long-term unemployed since 2001. The unprecedentedly high 
figures for 2005 were over 1.8 million long-term jobless. The trend among 
the low skilled without professional qualifications in Germany has been 
one of consistently rising unemployment since the 1970s; in western 
Germany in 2004 over 20% of this group was unemployed, in eastern 
Germany over 50%. The situation is truly dramatic. Reform is more 
urgently required than ever. 
 
This paper advocates the cautious and constitutional evolution of existing 
unemployment benefit instruments (Arbeitslosengeld II = ALG II) and 
Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT = "Einstiegsgeld") under Paragraph 
29 of the German Social Code (SGB II) into a means-tested combi-wage 
model for the future long-term unemployed (gradualism strategy). The 
proposed four component model is a combi-wage model within the 
existing basic income support system. The four component model consists 
of 1. degressive unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I) reduced 
stepwise over 12 months (insurance component), 2. a time-restricted 
income supplement up to the poverty line (TNIT component), 3. an 
indefinite entitlement to ALG II equivalent to a subsistence minimum 
(poverty gap concept component), and 4. an absorbing community or 
voluntary work element (workfare components). 
 As far as the three million existing unemployed ALG II claimants are 
concerned, this paper only argues for an additional, time-restricted 
income supplement (TNIT) up to the poverty line for each household type 
coupled with a stringently enforced duty to seek and accept work – with 
the aim of providing current unemployment II claimants with a powerful 
incentive to work at least 15 hours a week and thus to relinquish their 
unemployed status. 
 
Bearing in mind the uncertain employment impact and the related fiscal 
risks, the paper advises against additional financial incentives by reducing 
support levels from one day to the next (cold turkey strategy). In other 
words, the model represents a gradualist carrot-and-stick strategy 
intended to make low-paid jobs more attractive to the long-term 
unemployed. 
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Abstract 
 
 
This paper advocates the cautious and constitutional evolution of existing 
basic income schemes (“unemployment benefit II”) and Targeted Negative 
Income Tax (TNIT = "Einstiegsgeld") into a means-tested combi-wage 
model for the future long-term unemployed (gradualism strategy). The 
paper argues that, with regard to existing unemployment benefit II 
claimants, stronger financial incentives should be offered on a time 
restricted basis by largely disregarding (up to the relative poverty line) 
earnings from "mini", "midi" and part-time jobs – with the aim of 
providing current unemployment II claimants with a powerful incentive to 
work at least 15 hours a week and thus to relinquish their unemployed 
status. Bearing in mind the uncertain employment impact and the related 
fiscal risks, the paper advises against additional financial incentives by 
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1. Introduction 
 
After more than ten years of debate on wage subsidies (combi-wage) the 
year 2006 may finally bring the breakthrough: The 'grand coalition' is 
planning a legislative initiative on the combi-wage for the autumn of 2006. 
The government will be able to draw on the lessons learned from a large 
number of pilot schemes which have been run in recent years in Germany 
(cf. Kaltenborn 2001, 2005 and Dietz et al. 2005). The relevant debate 
has taken on board numerous proposals originating from the academic 
world, business and industry associations and the political parties – the 
FDP's suggestion of a citizen's wage, the ifo Institute's Combi-Wage Model 
(cf. Sinn et al. 2002, 2006) and the Magdeburger Alternative (cf. 
Schöb/Weimann 2005) are the concepts on which most debate has 
focused, although the respective pros and cons of each are not examined 
in this paper (cf. Spermann 2006 for a more detailed discussion). Instead, 
this paper presents a reform proposal which is based on practical 
experience with Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT) in Germany. 
Initially, however, the paper discusses the key problems on the labor 
market and the dynamic relationship between the duty to work and the 
financial incentives built into the design of a basic income support system 
(Chapter 2). Chapter 3 presents a simplified diagram, supported by recent 
basic income statistics, of the distorting incentive effects associated with 
the unemployment trap which contribute to prolonging periods of 
joblessness. The four-component model of fair basic income support 
based on insurance, TNIT, poverty gap concept, and workfare 
components, is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the potential 
employment and fiscal effects while Chapter 6 elaborates the advantages 
of a gradualist compared with a cold turkey strategy. Chapter 7 provides a 
brief conclusion. 
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2. Key Problems on the Labor Market and the Design of Basic 
Income Support 
 
Dramatic Increase in Numbers of Long-Term and Low-Skilled Unemployed 
 
The main problems on the German labor market are long-term 
unemployment and joblessness among the low skilled, although both 
problems do of course overlap (cf. Sachverständigenrat – the German 
Council of Economic Experts - 2005). Despite the Hartz reforms, the long-
term unemployment rate has leapt up in recent years and – as defined by 
the OECD – reached 51.8% in 2004 (cf. OECD 2005). According to figures 
published by the Federal Labor Institute (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), there 
has been a continuous increase in the number of long-term unemployed 
since 2001. The unprecedentedly high figures for 2005 were over 1.8 
million long-term jobless (cf. Federal Labor Institute 2005). The trend 
among the low skilled with without professional qualifications in Germany 
has been one of consistently rising unemployment since the 1970s; in 
western Germany in 2004 over 20% of this group was unemployed, in 
eastern Germany over 50% (cf. Reinberg/Hummel 2005). The situation is 
truly dramatic. Reform is more urgently required than ever. 
 
Dramatic Surge in the Number of People Receiving Basic Income Support 
 
The "basic jobseeker's allowance" (so-called unemployment benefit II = 
Arbeitslosengeld II = ALG II) was introduced throughout Germany under 
the German Social Code SGB II at the beginning of 2005. This entailed the 
merging of social assistance (Sozialhilfe) for claimants who are fit to work 
with unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) into a single new 
means-tested and tax-financed transfer system. In March 2004, the 
official administrative bodies anticipated that the new basic allowance 
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would be paid to around 3 million claimants. However, in March 2006 the 
actual figures for claimants of the basic allowance under SGB II is over 7 
million – more than twice as many as originally expected.  
 
The explanation for this development basically lies in two politically 
determined definitions which were not current in quite the same form 
prior to the reform. On the one hand, 'capacity to work' was defined in 
such broad terms that even drug addicts who were very unlikely to find a 
job were, for example, defined as available for work. On the other, the 
term low income household (Bedarfsgemeinschaft or a household entitled 
to receive benefits) was also defined in a way which created incentives for 
young adults to move out of their parental homes to form new low income 
households – with the result that in the space of a very short time the 
number of low income households rose to almost four million. In March 
2006, 5.2 million people were on ALG II and 1.85 million people – mainly 
children – were on social allowances (Sozialgeld) so that, in total, over 7 
million people were in receipt of basic income support under SGB II (cf. 
Federal Labor Institute 2006 a,b). 
 
Unemployed Claimants of Basic Income Support and of Combi-Wages 
 
From a labor market policy perspective, two subgroups of ALG II 
claimants are of particular significance. The almost three million registered 
unemployed ALG II claimants must be considered separately. A person is 
defined as unemployed if he or she works fewer than 15 hours a week. On 
the other hand, there are also over 900,000 people in work who also 
receive basic income support (cf. Federal Labor Institute 2006c). 
Unfortunately these subgroups overlap as the available statistics do not 
specify how many working claimants of ALG II are no longer registered 
unemployed because they are working over the threshold value of 15 
hours/week. A more detailed statistical breakdown is required to 
distinguish these two subgroups.  
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Failure to Enforce the Duty to Seek and Accept Work 
 
In Germany claimants of ALG II are subject to a duty to seek and accept 
work. With the introduction of the Job Center and the tightening up of 
suitability criteria requiring claimants to accept work under the Hartz laws, 
the duty to accept suitable jobs is much tougher than in the past, even if 
considerable regional differences persist. Even though the basic 
jobseeker's allowance has now been in force for over a year, Job Centers 
are still in the process of being set up. Case management in the working 
parties comprising the Federal Labor Institute and local authorities 
(ARGEn) is – apart from one or two exceptions – nothing like as intensive 
as that undertaken by the local labor offices themselves. A popular lament 
at the time this paper was written is that "in den ARGen noch viel im 
Argen liegt" (or "it's no party in the working parties"), particularly because 
the envisaged ratio of case managers to unemployed claimants has not 
yet been achieved. The situation is exacerbated by IT problems which eat 
up case manager's scare client contact time owing to the sheer volume of 
data which needs to be entered and corrected manually. However, in 
reality the duty to seek and accept work cannot be enforced if intensive 
case management is not available.  
 
But even if these transitional difficulties were to be solved in the near 
future, the absence of an automatic mechanism for reducing benefits and 
regular involvement of officially appointed doctors means that imposing 
benefit sanctions for those refusing a job is likely to remain an enduring 
problem. Although case managers are able to resort to "one-euro jobs" (in 
effect additional jobs) as a means of verifying a claimant's willingness to 
accept work, claimants are always entitled to lodge objections to, or bring 
an action against, any benefit reductions whilst claiming legal aid to cover 
all their court costs. As a result, case managers are currently having to 
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bear a huge increase in administrative work and consequently have less 
time available to support other clients.  
 
 
Is it Enough to Impose Compulsory Activation Requirements on Claimants 
Without Providing Financial Incentives? 
 
At first glance a consistently enforced duty on claimants receiving 
jobseeker's allowance to seek and accept work might appear to make 
additional financial incentives in the form of improved additional earnings 
options superfluous. However, compulsory activation is seriously 
hampered by the near impossibility of precisely assessing capacity to work 
in hourly categories (e.g. 5, 10, 15, 20 etc. hours). If we assume that 
officially appointed doctors are able to dictate a minimum hour working 
load (e.g. three hours a day) at reasonable costs, the more stringent the 
state is in urging compliance with compulsory activation policies, the more 
likely it is that people will accept work (participation decision). However – 
and this is the decisive argument in favor of additional financial incentives 
– the amount of time which individuals choose to spend beyond this 
administered threshold depends critically on the disregard rules in the 
transfer system (working hours decision). What is more, in a system in 
which work obligations are perfectly enforced and consistent benefit 
sanctions are imposed on those refusing to accept a job, there is a very 
strong incentive to acquire incapacity to work status in order to continue 
receiving benefits. The lessons learned by military draft boards have 
amply demonstrated how imaginative people can be in this respect. 
Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile thinking about the existing financial 
incentives for claimants receiving jobseeker's allowance and the way they 
respond to these rules, as well as about alternative arrangements. 
Enforcing the duty to work is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
tackling key labor market problems.  
 
 5
 3. Distorting Incentives Effects and the Unemployment Trap in 
2006 
 
The status quo of ALG II claimants in the year 2006 is illustrated more 
clearly by considering a simplified gross / net earnings diagram (Figure 1) 
drawing on the disregard rules which have been in force since October 1, 
2005. 
 
The average basic income support for a single person in western Germany 
is assumed to be €575. This amount is composed of a basic allowance of 
€345 and an amount to cover the combined costs of housing and heating 
of €230. Income earned by claimants is subject to a disregard of €100. 
The benefit reduction rate on earnings between €100 and €800 is 80% 
(t= 0.8), while claimants earning between €800 and €1200 have 90% of 
their additional earnings deducted from their benefit entitlement (t=0.9). 
The figures in this simplified example, which takes account of social 
security contributions and income tax, demonstrate that supplementary 
ALG II is paid to single people with gross earnings of up to €1,100. The 
case in which own earnings are (almost) entirely swallowed up by a 
reduction in benefit is referred to as the unemployment trap. Given the 
way the benefit withdrawal tables for single households work, it would 
hardly be worthwhile for a claimant on jobseeker's allowance to accept a 
mini job (€400) from which the claimant would only take home an extra 
€160.  
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Gross earnings 
Net earnings 
B=€575 
€100 €400 €800 €1,100 
45° 
Y* 
t=0.8 t=0.9 Net earnings line for those paying 
social security contributions and 
taxes 
Fig. 1: Status Quo, Single Claimant, Western Germany 
€845 
 
 
 
The unemployment trap is even more egregious for a family with two 
children (western Germany). The basic income support is significantly 
higher at €1,471 and is comprised of the basic allowance for two adults 
(€311 each), for two children under 14 (€207 for each child) and the costs 
of housing and heating amounting, in average, to €435. The additional 
earnings options are calculated as above, although the 90% withdrawal 
rule applies on earnings up to €1,500 for low income household with 
children. Over and above this gross earnings level, additional income is 
withdrawn in full (t=1). Claimants are entitled to supplementary ALG II if 
their gross earnings are below around €2,400 (Y*).  
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45° 
 
 
 
 
This clearly demonstrates how difficult it is for families in particular to 
escape from the transfer system, even those that make very great efforts 
to do so. If both partners were to accept full-time jobs on a wage of €5 an 
hour their joint earnings for working two 40-hour weeks would be around 
€1,600, which means that even in this case of full-time employment there 
would still be no alternative but to continue paying the family 
supplementary ALG II unless the hourly wage were to rise significantly.  
 
Empirical Relevance of the Unemployment Trap 
 
Differentiated empirical evaluations of the gainful employment of ALG II 
claimants are now available for September 2005 – a period in which 
disregard rules which were considerably more restrictive than those 
considered above were in force. The available figures show that around 
20% of ALG II claimants – 906,000 people in 844,000 low income 
Y* 
Gross earnings 
Net earnings 
Fig. 2: Status Quo, Family (2 Children), Western Germany 
t=0.8 t=0.9 
€1,780 
B=€1,471 
€400  €800 €1,200 €1,600 €2,000 
Net earnings line for those paying 
social security contributions and 
t=1 
taxes
€2,400 €100 
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households – were in gainful employment (cf. Federal Labor Institute 
2006c). Two phenomenon or behavioral responses are apparent:  
 
(a) "Stealth" employment 
Directors of security departments and job centers have provided anecdotal 
evidence of "stealth" employment when the pressure on people to accept 
work increases. Marginal employment is accepted, for example, in order to 
meet the legal requirement to seek and accept work and to avoid a 
reduction in benefit entitlement. This phenomenon is also substantiated by 
the latest evaluations performed by the Federal Labor Institute: more than 
half of all claimants work below the marginal earnings threshold of €400 
Euro – with a remarkably high frequency of jobs paying between €100 and 
€200 (gross earnings). 
  
(b) The working and the hidden poor 
Low skilled people, who are not only in marginal employment, but whose 
net earnings only just cover their basic needs, are often referred to as the 
working poor. The hidden poor are those do not claim their full 
entitlement to state transfer payments because of perceived stigma or 
because they are inadequately informed.  
 
Prior to the introduction of ALG II, several hundred thousand people were 
estimated to be living in hidden poverty because they failed to submit 
claims to the social security offices. Job centers appear to be less 
stigmatized than social security offices. One indication of this is the 
increase in the number of people entitled to submit supplementary claims. 
The number of claimants in gainful employment doubled, for example, 
from almost 470,000 previous social and unemployment assistance 
claimants to 906,000 ALG II recipients. However, this must be qualified by 
noting that no information was available about the number of hours 
worked or the distribution of gross earnings among people previously 
receiving social and unemployment assistance. 
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 Basic income reform must therefore take account of the fact that 
claimants in "stealth" employment are able to settle down permanently in 
the transfer system without having to fear having their benefits cut – and 
that they need to be enticed away from the transfer system with 
incentives. The number of claimants may also rise dramatically if claims 
are made for people in densely populated gross earnings categories. 
Accordingly, a reform of this nature would have to be implemented with 
great caution – not least because of the lack of comprehensive empirical 
knowledge and the imponderables concerning the response of those 
affected. 
 
 
4. Proposed Solution: The Four-Component Model of Fair Basic 
Income Support: a Means-Tested Combi-Wage Model for the Long-
Term Unemployed 
 
This paper advocates the cautious and constitutional evolution of existing 
unemployment benefit instruments (ALG II) and Targeted Negative 
Income Tax ("Einstiegsgeld") under Paragraph 29 of the German Social 
Code (SGB II) into a means-tested combi-wage model for the future long-
term unemployed (gradualism strategy). The four component model is a 
combi-wage model within the existing basic income support system. ALG 
II is the equivalent of an indefinite entitlement to income supplement; 
Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT or "Einstiegsgeld") on the other 
hand is time-restricted income supplement. As far as the three million 
existing unemployed ALG II claimants are concerned, this paper only 
argues for an additional, time-restricted income supplement (TNIT) up to 
the poverty line for each household type coupled with a stringently 
enforced duty to seek and accept work. In other words, the model 
represents a gradualist carrot-and-stick strategy intended to make low-
paid jobs more attractive to the long-term unemployed.  
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The four component model consists of 1. degressive unemployment 
benefit (ALG I) reduced stepwise over 12 months (insurance component), 
2. a time-restricted income supplement up to the poverty line (TNIT 
component), 3. an indefinite entitlement to ALG II equivalent to a 
subsistence minimum (poverty gap concept component), and 4. an 
absorbing community or voluntary work element (workfare components).  
 
 
In order to properly understand this proposal, it is important to distinguish 
between a number of different threshold values – as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Threshold Values For the Four Component Model 
 
 
 Single 
Family with 2 
children 
Social/cultural 
minimum income B 
€575 €1,471 
Subsistence minimum 
income (after halving 
of ALG II) 
B´´ 
€402.50 €1,160 
Break-even income Y* €840 €1,781 
Relative poverty line 
(60% of median 
income based on OECD 
formula) 
€938 €1,970 
 
(1) Social/cultural minimum income B 
The social/cultural minimum income referred to above corresponds with 
the requirements of the household type in the status quo and is composed 
of the basic allowance (ALG II), social allowances for children, and the 
combined cost of housing and heating.  
(2) Subsistence minimum income B´´ 
The subsistence minimum is not currently defined in the constitution. 
According to rulings on the Federal Social Assistance Act (BSHG) made in 
the social courts it would, however, be fair to assume that a 50% 
reduction in standard benefits in the case of a persistent refusal to accept 
work would not be overturned by the courts. A standard benefit for a 
single person of €345 (ALG II) could potentially be cut by €172.50, for 
example. In the case of standard benefits of €622 for both adults in a 
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four-person family, it would be possible to cut benefits by €311. The 
children's social allowance and the reimbursement of housing and heating 
costs would remain in place. In some cases benefits in kind would be 
granted instead of monetary benefits in order to ensure that the needs of 
children are met.  
(3) Break-even income Y* 
This income is the amount at which no further transfers are paid. To the 
right of Y* only taxes and fiscal charges are paid, while to the left of Y* 
transfer payments are made (although taxes and fiscal charges may, in 
certain circumstances, also be paid); Y* only lies on the 45° line if no 
taxes and fiscal charges need to be paid.  
(4) Relative poverty line 
The relative poverty line is identical with the OECD definition found in the 
German government's report on the rich-poor divide (cf. Bundesregierung 
2005). The OECD poverty line for singles is 60% of median income or 
€938 in 2004. For a family this value is equivalent to a value of 1 for the 
first adult, 0.5 for the second adult and the figure 0.3 for each child in the 
household, adding up to €1970 (2.1 x €938) for two-child families.  
 
Component 1: Degressive Unemployment Benefit Reduced Stepwise Over 
12 Months 
 
The first component is aimed at bringing about a change in the benefits 
side of the unemployment insurance equation. Instead of the current 
practice of limiting payment of unemployment benefits to 12 months and 
paying the benefit as a constant proportion of the claimant's last earned 
net income, the benefit could be paid at progressively lower levels over 
time (cf. the German Council of Economic Experts 2003). This would mean 
that the loss in income in the first few months of unemployment would be 
significantly lower than is currently the case, enabling search activities to 
be maximized. Within a period of one year, unemployment benefit would 
sink substantially as the total value of payments is to remain unchanged. 
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At the same time, additional earnings up to the relative poverty line would 
continue to disregarded – in contrast to the current situation in which only 
€165 is disregarded and amounts over and above this are deducted in full 
from the insurance benefit.  
 
Component 2: Degressive TNIT  
 
Empirical studies based on experiments with control groups demonstrate 
the positive employment effects of time-restricted income supplements 
paid to the long-term unemployed (cf. Spermann/Strotmann 2005). 
International experience with time-restricted supplements - in Canada for 
example – have proved to be successful, as evaluation studies with control 
groups have shown (cf. Michalopoulos et al. 2005). 
In principle TNIT is already part of the current basic jobseeker's allowance 
system and in fact 17,600 relevant cases were registered in 2005 (cf. 
Federal Labor Institute 2006b). Internal Federal Labor Institute guidelines 
also envisage the use of these back-to-work bonuses for self-employed 
people in particular (the "me incorporated [Ich-AG]" instrument and 
transitional benefits under the Social Code (SGB III) are not available to 
ALG II claimants). As a result 86% of financial support was dedicated to 
self-employed recipients and only 14% to the acceptance of employment 
subject to compulsory social insurance contributions. Practice differs 
markedly from region to region, however.  
The state government of Saxony-Anhalt, for example – a region with a 
very high level of unemployment – has made massive use of these 
instruments with the outcome that around 60% of unemployed claimants 
receiving this form of support switched, with the aid of TNIT, into 
employment subject to compulsory social insurance (cf. Federal Labor 
Institute 2006b). 
Whether or not supplementary financial support is granted continues to be 
at the discretion of case managers and the strategies adopted by 
individual job centers. Experiences with TNIT from pilot studies run in 
Baden-Württemberg and Hesse demonstrate, however, that case 
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managers in the agencies often regard incentive instruments with 
considerable skepticism. They tend to adopt the argument that claimants 
are subject to a duty to seek and accept work and that there is therefore 
no need for any additional incentives. Differentiated analyses of 
administrative data at the national level are not yet available (studies in 
this direction will be launched by the IAB in the future). 
 
The basic idea underlying TNIT is discussed in detail in Spermann (2001). 
In the current institutional framework, ALG II claimants are the target 
group for this supplementary payment. The continued development of 
TNIT links current time-restricted disregards of claimants' earned income 
with the relative poverty line for each type of household and a gradual and 
automatic reduction in ALG II (not of the social allowance) to a 
subsistence minimum income which conforms with constitutional 
requirements. The social/cultural minimum income for a single person is 
the current ALG II level of €575 (basic rate plus housing costs). The 
subsistence minimum income is €402 (50% of the basic rate plus housing 
costs). The relative poverty line as defined by the OECD and as used in 
the German government's report on the rich-poor divide is €938 for a 
single person or 60% of median income. 
 
The following figures (3a-c) illustrate the two components of this proposal 
drawing on the example of a single person: 
After one year of unemployment, unemployed claimants receive basic 
jobseeker's allowance under SGB II if they successfully pass a tough 
means test. During the first month in which they are in receipt of benefits 
they are entitled to claim TNIT. Figure 3a demonstrates that in this way 
the income derived from a mini job is disregarded so that the poverty line 
of €938 can be reached. In other words, a mini job becomes just as 
attractive as moonlighting – if only for a limited period of time. In contrast 
to the situation today, a mini job is financially less attractive to claimants 
– with the outcome that only around 8% of those with mini jobs were 
 15
previously unemployed (cf. Fertig et al. 2004). We may therefore 
anticipate that a combination of more stringently applied work 
requirements (the stick) and financial incentives (the carrot) will induce 
the long-term unemployed to step up their efforts to acquire mini jobs. 
 
However, unless it is accompanied by other measures this incentive may 
well lead to new "stealth" employment – i.e. ALG II plus a mini job. It is 
for this reason that the TNIT must be degressive over time. This can be 
achieved by making automatic and gradual reductions in ALG II down to a 
constitutionally permissible subsistence minimum income. Figures 3b and 
3c illustrate this additional incentive mechanism which pushes the long-
term unemployed into earning more than they would in a mini job. The 
message is clear: unless they are more active in their job searching, they 
will have less disposable income. If, after the time-restricted TNIT income 
supplement has expired, the claimant's earnings are still only just 
sufficient to cover basic needs, the third component of the model comes 
into play.  
The period for which TNIT is granted may vary according to the type of 
household concerned. The larger the household is, the longer the period 
during which TNIT is granted given that a higher net income is required in 
order to permanently escape the unemployment trap.  
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Net earnings line for those 
paying social security 
contributions and taxes 
Gross earnings 
Net earnings 
B=€575 
€100 €400 €800 €1,100 
45° 
Y*
Fig. 3(a): 2. Component – Month 1, Single Claimant, Western Germany 
€938 
Time-restricted TNIT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net earnings line for those 
paying social security 
contributions and taxes 
Gross earnings 
Net earnings 
€100 €400 €800 €1,100 
45° 
Y*
Fig. 3(b): 2. Component – Month 6, Single Claimant, Western Germany 
B‘=€500 
€938 
Time restricted 
TNIT 
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Component 3: Indefinite Basic Income Support Based on the Poverty Gap 
Concept 
 
The third component provides for indefinitely payable basic income 
support at a subsistence minimum level – for future long-term 
unemployed claimants. This component is based on Milton Friedman's 
poverty gap concept (1962/68). In the long run this component also does 
away with the unemployment trap. In contrast to the present system, 
there is an ongoing financial incentive to work more even after TNIT has 
expired. It is true that, at a benefit reduction rate of around 66%, the 
marginal burden for claimants is relatively high – however, this could only 
be reduced further by either cutting ALG II levels even further (B’’ drops 
further) and/or lifting the transfer limit Y* so that it applies to higher 
gross earnings. Neither of these options would be advisable. A reduction 
beneath the subsistence minimum would conflict with constitutional 
requirements, and an increase in the transfer limit would entail an 
enormous additional fiscal burden.  
 
Gross earnings 
Net earnings 
€100 €400 €800 €1,100 
45° 
Y* Net earnings line for those 
paying social security 
contributions and taxes 
Fig. 4: Component 3, Single Claimants, Western Germany 
B‘‘=402 € 
€845 
t=0.66 
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Similar scenarios can be mapped for larger households – although for 
space reasons these cannot be dealt with in this paper. Three points must, 
however, be underlined. First: The reduction to a subsistence minimum 
income level only relates to standard benefits, not however to the social 
allowance (cf. Table 1). Second: The TNIT for this type of household 
would push people towards accepting midi jobs (up to €800) or part-time 
employment – they would then be able to work their way out poverty 
under their own steam and, with the help of additional earnings, reach the 
relative poverty line of €1,970. Rising hourly wage rates (productivity 
effect) and more working hours (working hours effect) would, in certain 
circumstances, allow both partners to earn a gross income which would 
enable them to live permanently outside the transfer system. They would 
in any case remain in the working process so that their human capital 
would not be eroded by long-term unemployment and their social 
networks would be maintained.  
 
 
 
Third: Even after TNIT expires – three years after a person becomes 
unemployed – there would still be a financial incentive to earn more even 
if the benefit reduction rate is relatively high at 71%. This again 
underlines the crucial need to enforce the duty to seek and accept work. 
In a basic income support system which provides relatively generous 
income support, it will not be possible to offer permanent financial 
incentives (carrots) which will be able to compete at all with moonlighting, 
and it is therefore essential that the model is backed up by the duty to 
seek and accept work (sticks).  
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Component 4: Community Work in Exceptional Cases (Workfare 
Component) 
 
Any reform of basic income support aimed at improving financial 
incentives and tightening up the legal requirement to seek and accept 
work must offer a solution to the dilemma of how people who cannot find 
work on the labor market, despite their ability to demonstrate that they 
have made strenuous efforts, should be treated. This is where community 
work can play an important role – although as the exception rather than 
the rule.  
Community work becomes relevant as soon as ALG II begins to fall. A 
social/cultural minimum income is intended to be secured with the help of 
community work – with working hours varying according to type of 
household – not, however, an income at the poverty line level. This 
ensures that it is always more worthwhile to accept private jobs than to 
undertake community work – in contrast to the current system in which 
one-euro jobs can prove to be financially more attractive than mini jobs, 
for example. 
 
Community work would continue to be used to assess claimant's 
willingness to accept work. This instrument has proved effective in a) 
deterring people from making claims who are not in fact willing to accept 
work and b) ensuring that cuts in the benefits received by claimants who 
refuse work are legally watertight. On the other hand, it became apparent 
in 2005 that some ALG II claimants do not regard one-euro jobs as a 
sanction, but that these jobs are regarded as a welcome employment 
opportunity (cf. Koch et al. 2005). Community work thus fulfils a dual role 
as an instrument to check up on a claimant's willingness to accept work 
and to provide desirable occupations for the long-term unemployed who 
are unable to find employment on the open labor market.  
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 5. Employment Effects and Fiscal Impact 
 
Field studies with control groups in Germany have demonstrated that 
time-restricted income supplements – such as TNIT – increase the 
probability of employment (cf. Spermann/Strotmann 2005). Indefinitely 
payable income supplements based on the poverty gap concept – in other 
words a reduction in benefit levels and lower benefit reduction rates – 
have positive employment effects, as simulation studies performed by the 
ZEW with the general equilibrium model show (Boeters et al. 2003). 
Positive employment effects are even more probable if a reform of basic 
income support is backed up by labor law reforms (shorter dismissal 
protection periods and lower back-to-work wages for the long-term 
unemployed) and collective bargaining measures (larger wage spread). 
Positive employment effects would bring fiscal savings with them.  
 
 
The author of this paper can only speculate however on the extent and 
sustainability of these employment effects and the resulting fiscal impact. 
Neither microsimulation studies nor general equilibrium models are 
capable of producing reliable results because ultimately both are based on 
the behavioral responses of people in a world in which a legal low-wage 
sector is, to all intents and purposes, very small or even non-existent. 
Empirical elasticities on which such models draw, are based on 
observations in wage segments which exist today – it goes without saying 
that they cannot be based on the responses of people in an, as yet, non-
existent low-wage sector. The significance of non-cognitive abilities in 
filling jobs in a low-wage service sector continues to be underestimated 
(cf. Hieming et al. 2005). For this reason well-founded skepticism is 
warranted as far as model calculations are concerned which promise 
major employment gains and high levels of fiscal savings.   
 
 21
What is more, the available empirical ex ante microsimulations for the 
low-wage sector are only able to capture partial effects and to provide 
educated guesses about where the impact will be felt. Microsimulations of 
mini jobs are not, for example, able to capture the basic impact of sideline 
employment, as this type of model only allows for the simulation of 
changes in main occupations (cf. Arntz/Feil/Spermann 2003 and 
Steiner/Wrohlich 2004). Impressive though this is, it nonetheless only 
covers part of the overall picture.  
 
Empirical studies with existing simulation models are, however, able to 
demonstrate under what circumstances neutral or negative employment 
effects and additional fiscal burdens may arise. The introduction of a 
minimum wage would be counterproductive – existing jobs below the 
agreed minimum wage would be destroyed, new jobs in the low-wage 
sector would not be created at all. A combi-wage reform which expanded 
the population of entitled claimants would be fiscally extremely risky: 
additional fiscal burdens would be guaranteed, but the additional 
employment effects in an inflexible labor market would be highly 
uncertain. High minimum wages and an across-the-board combi-wage for 
the low-skilled under existing legal and collective bargaining restraints 
would prove a fiasco.  
 
 
6. The Advantages of the Gradualism Strategy Compared with the 
Cold Turkey Strategy 
 
Bearing in mind the many imponderables and the lack of empirical clarity 
regarding the level of employment effects, as well as the resulting fiscal 
impact, this paper argues in favor of a gradual strategy – in contrast to a 
cold turkey strategy which promises an immediate reduction in benefit 
levels and substantially higher employment of up to 3.2 million people in 
work, plus fiscal savings of up to 21 billion euros (cf. Sinn et al. 2006).  
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 Fairness Considerations 
 
For reasons of fairness, the combi-wage reform coupled with an automatic 
trimming down of basic income support to a subsistence minimum should 
only be focused on future ALG II claimants who would be able to adjust 
their behavior accordingly in good time.  
 
As far as existing ALG II claimants are concerned – those who have 
previously been in employment for many years and who have slipped into 
long-term unemployment as a result of structural changes – fairness 
would dictate a different approach. Current ALG II claimants have 
received the message over decades of their working lives that, should 
they become unemployed, they would be able to rely on a system of 
unemployment insurance which would provide them with a transfer 
income coupled to their previous take-home pay. All the economic 
decisions taken by this group have also been taken in this framework. The 
merging of unemployment assistance and social assistance at social 
assistance levels has already produced several hundred thousand reform 
losers (cf. Rudolph/Blos 2005). It would be inappropriate to further reduce 
the benefits payable to this group of people, who would then be forced to 
engage in community work in order to maintain the level of their benefit 
entitlements.  
 
Existing ALG II claimants could, however, be at least motivated to take up 
mini, midi and part-time jobs if adjustments were made to the additional 
earnings regulations. Where these mini jobs entail more than 15-hours of 
work a week, these ALG II claimants would no longer be counted as 
unemployed, even if they continued to receive supplementary ALG II. A 
realistic intermediary target for a combi-wage reform for existing ALG II 
might be the loss of "unemployed" status. As approximately 2.8 million 
ALG II claimants are registered unemployed, this would represent a major 
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step in the right direction, and one that would substantially reduce the 
fiscal burden. It should prove easier for people to find fulltime 
employment if they already have a job than would be the case if they 
were to seek work as an unemployed applicant.  
 
 
Reduced Scope of Community Work 
 
A combination of time-restricted and permanent income supplements 
would almost certainly reduce the scale of community work undertaken in 
comparison with a cold turkey strategy. On the one hand, the long-term 
unemployed may move out the basic income support system within the 
time limits as a result of rising wages and higher hourly wage rates – they 
are able to find their way into the labor market and, in certain 
circumstances, break out of the basic income system without being 
dependent on community work. On the other hand, benefits received by 
future ALG II claimants would only gradually be reduced to a subsistence 
minimum so that more time would be available to seek a job in the private 
labor market.  
 
Avoiding the Production of Working Poor 
 
A further element of the four component model is the link between time 
restricted income supplements and the poverty line. This can enable the 
long-term unemployed to work their own way out of poverty – and out of 
the category of the working poor – within a specified timeframe. A 
substantial number of long-term unemployed people may be expected to 
remain in employment once they have managed the leap into the private 
labor market. The lessons learned from field experiments with TNIT in 
Germany suggest that people tend to get used to higher incomes – around 
60% of those receiving TNIT support remained in employment even after 
the scheme had expired (cf. Dann et al. 2002).  
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7. Conclusion 
 
A cautious change of system to a combi-wage system would appear to be 
an appropriate way of enabling people and institutions to adapt – in 
particular with regard to labor law and collectively agreed structures 
(gradualism strategy). A distinction must, however, be made between 
future long-term unemployed people and existing long-term unemployed 
claimants. Those who become unemployed in the future should receive a 
clear message from the state that their state income supplement will drop 
to a subsistence minimum wage level and that individual effort combined 
with generous disregard rules make a life above the poverty line possible. 
The status of a member of the working poor can be avoided by individual 
effort. The four component model describes such a system consisting of 
time-restricted and indefinitely payable income supplements with an 
automatic reduction in basic income support to the level of a subsistence 
minimum income. At the same time, current unemployed ALG II claimants 
should – out of fairness considerations – only be offered generous time-
restricted income supplements (TNIT) to motivate them to work at least 
15 hours a week and thus to lose their status as unemployed. 
 
The danger inherent in a fast change of system (cold turkey strategy) in 
which benefits for all ALG II claimants are immediately and substantially 
reduced is that the employment effects promised by its protagonists will 
not materialize in anything like the near future because the behavioral 
responses in the low-wage sector have been incorrectly understood and 
non-cognitive abilities crucial for successful job matches are ignored. If 
employment effects fail to materialize, fiscal savings above and beyond 
those arising from cuts in ALG II alone would not be realized. This would 
entail the establishment of community work opportunities on a major 
scale which would again generate very high fiscal costs. The net fiscal 
effect is uncertain. The logical conclusion is: Better gradualism than cold 
turkey. 
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